Why is it impossible for the teacher to know "all there is about justice"? Surely they can know enough to teach a student what the word "justice" means (i.e. how to use the word "justice"). After all, didn't someone teach you what "justice" means? And couldn't you teach the meaning of the word to someone else? — Luke
I don't believe that #426 is typically regarded to be in the rule-following section of PI, but we could look at 218-221 instead.
* * *
That's all very possible; it's just not what I see as being the point of Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following, or anything he's actually talking about. — Luke
You seem to think that Wittgenstein genuinely holds that "All the steps are really already taken" (219). I read him, instead, as saying that we should not become captivated by, or fear, this misleading picture. As he says at 221, this is "really a mythological description of the use of a rule." — Luke
that the line does not nod, or whisper, or tell us (#223); that we do not follow along it as a path "on tenterhooks", anxious each second about society's moral judgment (our intention, what we "mean").
— Antony Nickles
I don't know why you bring "society's moral judgment" into it. This is simply another description to reinforce the point that rules are not privately determined. — Luke
I see [ #217 ] more in accordance with his remark at #1: "Explanations come to an end somewhere." — Luke
I can give a definition of justice, which I take as what you are referring to when you say "teach a student what the word 'justice' means", but does a definition contain "all there is"? — Antony Nickles
You've also fallen back on teaching "how to use the word" justice, but do we teach how to use words? — Antony Nickles
I will claim again that this a misunderstanding; that Witt would say there is a use of a concept, as in its sense (one among possible others). — Antony Nickles
"What use of justice are we talking about?" morally right? lawful judgment? fairness? to appreciate properly? — Antony Nickles
And that these are not "teachable" with a definition in the sense Witt is getting at with our aligned lives. — Antony Nickles
We see examples of being fair, we experience injustice, we know the law, we do justice to our father's memory... Again, the "meaning" of a word is taken apart in PI, as a bit of knowledge, and turned about towards the grammar of a concept which shows us what is meaningful about one use compared to another, why we make such a distinction, yada yada. — Antony Nickles
I think maybe I need more than not "typically regarded" or "just not what [you] see" to feel this is a rational critique rather than just feeling you've only gone as far as you want into the text. — Antony Nickles
Directly following the rule-following sections in PI, and therefore easily thought to be the upshot of the discussion, are those sections called by interpreters “the private-language argument”. Whether it be a veritable argument or not (and Wittgenstein never labeled it as such), these sections point out that for an utterance to be meaningful it must be possible in principle to subject it to public standards and criteria of correctness. For this reason, a private-language, in which “words … are to refer to what only the speaker can know—to his immediate private sensations …” (PI 243), is not a genuine, meaningful, rule-governed language. The signs in language can only function when there is a possibility of judging the correctness of their use, “so the use of [a] word stands in need of a justification which everybody understands” (PI 261). — SEP
To say that he should have said it strikes him that the "steps are taken" is not to say it's not true (nor saying that it is "mythological") that they are already taken... — Antony Nickles
219. “All the steps are really already taken” means: I no longer have any choice. The rule, once stamped with a particular meaning, traces the lines along which it is to be followed through the whole of space. —– But if something of this sort really were the case, how would it help me?
No; my description made sense only if it was to be understood symbolically. — I should say: This is how it strikes me.
221. My symbolical expression was really a mythological description of the use of a rule. — LW
"we misunderstand the nature of following rules if we think that ‘having no choice’ in this context means that in some medium the rule traces out its own applications in advance of being applied, and hence one has no choice. For if something like that were the case, how would it help one to make the transition to action?"
"Hence the description ‘All the steps are really already taken’ only makes sense if understood figuratively (like the wings on Father Time). So understood, it signifies the fact that I do not choose. For once having understood the rule, I am bound in what I do further, not in the sense of being compelled, but ‘I am bound in my judgement about what is in accord with the rule and what not’ (RFM 328f.). Hence, if I want to follow the rule, ‘then only doing this will correspond to it’ (RFM 332). So I follow the rule blindly: not like a machine, but with the blindness of complete assurance." — Baker and Hacker, Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity: Volume 2 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, Essays and Exegesis §§185-242, p. 197
...but just that they are not "steps", we don't "follow" the line the rule "traces". All of this stepping, following traces, is how things look (from our desire to be caused along the way) against the way we (logically) "blindly" follow a rule; we do not have our eyes open, looking, intending, choosing each step. — Antony Nickles
Even with all that, I think we agree that it is not an internal determination of the rule, which is all I mean to say: that rules are (logically, i.e., that's what they're for; they function) to be obeyed, but not all grammar functions in that way. Rules take "us" out of the equation (math pun intended), but our ordinary, non-mathematical, grammar for learning, justice, sitting in a chair, are not based on, to be understood as, rules. — Antony Nickles
that the line does not nod, or whisper, or tell us (#223); that we do not follow along it as a path "on tenterhooks", anxious each second about society's moral judgment (our intention, what we "mean").
— Antony Nickles
I don't know why you bring "society's moral judgment" into it. This is simply another description to reinforce the point that rules are not privately determined.
— Luke
That's a small take-away; can't we even grant that Witt learns why we want them to be? Much less that if we imagine ourselves, as Kripke does, just confidently acting on rules we've been "taught", the only possibility is for correction because you didn't follow the rule (thus the anxiety). — Antony Nickles
"[ No explanation ] stands in need of another — unless we require it to avoid a misunderstanding. One might say: an explanation serves to remove or to prevent a misunderstanding —– one, that is, that would arise if not for the explanation, but not every misunderstanding that I can imagine." #87
Explanations avoid, remove, or prevent a certain type of misunderstanding. But there are other misunderstandings we could imagine... — Antony Nickles
For a particular meaning/use of the word [justice], yes. It is both possible for the teacher to know "all there is about justice" and for the definition that is taught to contain "all there is". See §75, for instance. — Luke
The concept of justice was picked as an example of when sometimes we don't/won't know how a concept will matter, what criteria will have what importance and to whom--its criteria make its grammar a different type than concepts with mathematical criteria. — Antony Nickles
"Anything--and nothing--is right. This is the position you are in if you look for a definition corresponding to our concepts in aesthetics and ethics." #77. That this is different then the certainty (lack of disagreement) we have in math. p. 192. And asking if my knowledge is completely expressed by the explanations I could give (#75), describes that my unconscious familiarity can be made exhaustively explicit, but does not say that a concept is finite, complete in advance, learned by saying X (#75 is not about definitions, but explanations) — Antony Nickles
and there is no limit to the explanations that I might have to give (to the student), and it is I who might become exhausted, our relation break down, rather than we have tidy all-encompassing rules justified to begin with, and the student is either right or wrong. — Antony Nickles
A concept can also be brought into new, unexpected contexts, extended Witt will say at #67, or he uses the analogy of continuing a series. — Antony Nickles
or he uses the analogy of continuing a series. As in "being inclined" in our beginning quote, when making a mistake in continuing a series, we are tempted to say that the student has understood wrong #143, as Kripke's society would judge, as if we have a complete list of how things can go wrong. But we say only that the student has "mastered the system" (#145) "followed the series as I do" But "we cannot state a limit" on when we have a right to say that. "Our pupil's capacity to learn may come to an end." #143. This is my claim that it is "impossible" to nail everything down for all time in any situation. — Antony Nickles
In the extension of non-mathematical concepts we do not have the ability to say " 'and so on', in order to reach infinity." — Antony Nickles
This is where Cavell's student and teacher begin. — Antony Nickles
you say we teach how to "use" words, but that seems different than Witt's point that, in teaching meaning, we teach the use of a word in the language — Antony Nickles
We don't show how to, say, wield the word, but show the word's place(s) in our world, how it is meaningful in our lives. — Antony Nickles
Sure, but learning the rule does not ensure correctness, nor that, even if correct, that there would be the same justification (if any need for one). I am not unreflectively "confident" or "assured" of following the rule correctly (granting myself authority); I give over my responsibility to the rule, no longer needing to make anymore decisions (further steps--a myth is not a lie or wrong; the picture, though not literal, still strikes: see p. 180). In obeying the rule (not myself) I can be "blind" to the consequences, not responsible. I do not "judge" as Hacker claims (#222). The justifications for obeying the rule are different than the explanation (afterwards) for having followed it incorrectly. — Antony Nickles
And if they are acting from an internal/individual assessment (their "judgment") of what is in accord ("right")(even if that was as you claim, only in learning it), they are subject to the correction of society when they are wrong--their fear of exclusion is their desire for criteria (a rule I can know, be assured of) that will ensure that does not happen. — Antony Nickles
He is investigating why we want "obeying rules" (meaning; knowledge of the other) to be "privately determined", reliant on us individually (say, our confidence). Why he keeps trying to make sense of the interlocutor's obsession, fixation. This is not just an argument for a different picture (or a confusion to be alleviated), it is an investigation into the human condition, our desire to not have to rely on the human. — Antony Nickles
it is, rather, essential to our investigation that we do not seek to learn anything new by it. We want to understand something that is already in plain view. For this is what we seem in some sense not to understand. (89)
Our inquiry is therefore a grammatical one. And this inquiry sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, brought about, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of our language. (90)
The preconception of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole inquiry around. (One might say: the inquiry must be turned around, but on the pivot of our real need. (108)
There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. All explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light — that is to say, its purpose — from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; but they are solved through an insight into the workings of our language, and that in such a way that these workings are recognized — despite an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by coming up with new discoveries, but by assembling what we have long been familiar with. (109)
115. A picture held us captive. And we couldn’t get outside it, for it lay in our language, and language seemed only to repeat it to us inexorably.
116. When philosophers use a word — “knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”, proposition/sentence”, “name” — and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in which it is at home? — What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. — LW
And the way we measure whether a concept's grammar has been met is through criteria for having done them, not rules — Antony Nickles
the criteria for a game being all over the place, the criteria for justice being subject to disagreement — Antony Nickles
In the extension of non-mathematical concepts we do not have the ability to say " 'and so on', in order to reach infinity."
— Antony Nickles
what does it mean for rules to be "all-encompassing" and "justified to begin with"? — Luke
Wittgenstein's intent with these remarks is not to demonstrate that it is impossible to "nail everything down for all time", although this kind of "preconception of crystalline purity" is one of his targets in the book. §143 deals with understanding, rule following, being guided by a rule, and normal/abnormal reactions. — Luke
you say we teach how to "use" words, but that seems different than Witt's point that, in teaching meaning, we teach the use of a word in the language
— Antony Nickles
I say that we teach how to use words, but [you say] Witt's point is that we teach how to use words in the language? — Luke
I don't know what you mean by "I give over my responsibility to the rule". What responsibility? — Luke
The larger point, of Wittgenstein's, is that concepts are still "usable" (and, thereforefter mistaken , teachable) even if they have "blurred edges" (see §69). W's point at §77 seems to me to be that some concepts are simply resistant to sharper definition. — Luke
This is where Cavell's student and teacher begin.
— Antony Nickles
But this is where Wittgenstein's student and teacher end. Likewise, Wittgenstein's turned spade is not an invitation for further explanation (see §87 again). — Luke
This is the criteria that Cavell is describing as "mathematical", which he believes Kripke is aspiring to impose on the grammar of all concepts, any action. — Antony Nickles
That we learn rules, instead of having lives... — Antony Nickles
...and that right and wrong are simply a matter of obeying the rules or not... — Antony Nickles
(what is right is worked out ahead of time; — Antony Nickles
Cavell takes Kripke's view of rules as "more skeptical than the skeptic", meaning that the desire for purity (certainty, pre-determination, simple enforcement) is satisfied by making rules central to our agreement (then we can teach the rule, rather than the student, rather than agree in our lives) — Antony Nickles
The distinction hinges on the difference between words as used (as if, by rules) and seeing that there are different things an expression, for example, can do: be a threat, an invitation, etc. — Antony Nickles
So we do not have to be answerable for the action; we can point to the rule as the answer of why we did the action, abdicating our responsibility to be intelligible to the other, respond to their claims on us about what we have done. — Antony Nickles
Cavell’s claim is that Witt is comparing rules to ordinary (not instituted) criteria (see the PI index: having a dream, remembering right, mistaking, talking to oneself), so we are not just deciding true or false compared to something we have found certain (or which aspires to a mathematical rule). — Antony Nickles
Our judgment of the other (their act) is not based on a rule they either obeyed or not (except when it is, say, the law) — Antony Nickles
This is the criteria that Cavell is describing as "mathematical", which he believes Kripke is aspiring to impose on the grammar of all concepts, any action.
— Antony Nickles
Grammar applies only to language use, not to "any action" - unless you have a reason to think otherwise? — Luke
We are taught both how to wield words and how they are meaningful in our lives. — Luke
...and that right and wrong are simply a matter of obeying the rules or not...
— Antony Nickles
But they are. Otherwise, there is no rule. — Luke
So we do not have to be answerable for the action; we can point to the rule as the answer of why we did the action, abdicating our responsibility to be intelligible to the other, respond to their claims on us about what we have done.
— Antony Nickles
I do not understand how we "abdicat[e] our responsibility to be intelligible to the other" by following rules. — Luke
Aren't we responsible both for following rules and for not following rules (that is, once we know the rules)? — Luke
In terms of intelligibility, I would say that following the rules (e.g. in chess) is what allows us to make ourselves (our moves) intelligible to our opponent — Luke
Yes, that is literally the kind of claims he is making. That the structure of our language and that of our lives are (usually, for the most part) them same—this is carried from the Tractatus but a different kind of form for each thing, each type of act; and we are looking for its “logic” (on its terms) rather than imposing a fixed criteria. A grammar for excuses (Austin), for apologies, for a threat, for acknowledging pain, for treating someone as if they have a soul, for raising one's arm, for justifying or disagreeing. Grammatical comments highlight the criteria of a thing—what is essential for it to be that thing: learning, mistaking, reading, talking, lying, seeing, etc. — Antony Nickles
[Wittgenstein] does not see grammar as comprised merely of syntactic rules, but of any rule that governs 'the way we are going to talk' (MWL 72): 'By grammatical rule I understand every rule that relates to the use of a language' (VOW 303).
...grammar consists of the conditions of intelligibility of a language. It is the conventionally-established basis on which we can make sense: 'Grammar consists of conventions' (PG 138), keeping in mind that conventions here are not due to a concerted consensus, but to an unconcerted agreement in practice.
...grammar includes '[a]ll the requirements for sense'...
'The connection between "language and reality" is made by definitions of words, and these belong to grammar', writes Wittgenstein (PG 97).
...the Tractatus sets the stage for what Wittgenstein will later call 'grammar': grammar is that which enables or regulates sense (and so is itself nonsensical) and cannot meaningfully be said in the flow of the language-game but only heuristically articulated.
At the conceptual basis of our confrontation with experience are not bare particulars, but grammar: it is grammar that tells us what kind of object anything is (PI 373).
...when Wittgenstein speaks of the correspondence between concepts and nature, he is talking about the correspondence between the structures of concepts – that is, our grammatical rules – our grammar – and facts of nature. Take the concept of pain, some of the 'structures' of that concept can be expressed in grammatical rules such as: 'Human beings are normally susceptible to pain'; 'Tables and chairs don't feel pain'; 'There is psychological as well as physical pain', etc. In these passages, then, Wittgenstein is saying that of course we are interested in the correspondence between our grammar and very general facts of nature, but not in the way natural scientists or historians are interested in this correspondence. That is, we are not interested in any empirical justification or historical account for our having the grammatical rules we do. — Daniele Moyall-Sharrock
Our lives are meaningful, and we learn words (moreover, concepts) in coming into our culture, acting, failing, interacting, becoming part of everything everyone does. Again this picture of "meaning" is getting in the way. Our expressions, as our lives, don't have a "meaning" attached to them; part of the confusion Witt recognizes is that we believe that since we can give a definition ("meaning") for ever word, that this is how all language works (reference/correspondence). — Antony Nickles
To obey a rule is to obey it correctly (do it right) or wrong (fail to obey it). Justifications can differ as to why we obeyed it, and we can argue about what it means to have (rightly) obeyed a particular rule, but what is right and what is wrong are not contained/decided by rules (unless they are set by us--laws, commandments, etc.). — Antony Nickles
If I am following the rule, I may only have, "I was following the rule." And so cannot explain, detail, qualify, defend, make explicit, distinguish, or justify myself, except as to how I believe following the rule is done and that I did it. — Antony Nickles
You can hold me responsible for the act, and for my choice to follow the rule (though, in following the rule, if I judge the rule as irresponsible, I am not obeying it (#222)). — Antony Nickles
And I can claim I was following the rule as an excuse from the guilt/wrong, but Kripke's society is judging my having followed the rule or not, not whether the rule itself is right/wrong — Antony Nickles
If I am behaving as expected there is no need to make myself intelligible (as we don’t ask after intention unless something phishy happens). If you have broken the rules of chess and I tell you, and you claim you did not, you must explain yourself if we are to go forward, together. For you to explain in what sense you intended, or so that you know what is at stake and have a chance to qualify what seems inexplicable from my position. This may come to our being unable to reconcile, however, as Cavell will say elsewhere about it: though we are endlessly separate, there is no depth to which langauge can not reach, and we are answerable for everything that comes between us. — Antony Nickles
for Wittgenstein, grammar is about the sense of the words "excuse", "apology", "threat", "pain", "learning", "reading", "talking", "lying", "seeing", etc. Our actions are obviously related to the use of these words, but grammar is not about the actions themselves (independently of the words/concepts). — Luke
What if someone breaks (or fails to learn) the rules of grammar (i.e. the bounds of sense)? This is a "depth" that language cannot "reach" or reconcile. — Luke
I hope you do not intend to argue against Wittgenstein's position, famously summarised as "meaning is use".. — Luke
I can wield/use the words "Pass the salt" as a command/request, for example. — Luke
Moore's paradox can be put like this: the expression "I believe that this is the case" is used like the assertion "This is the case"; and yet the hypothesis that I believe this is the case is not used like the hypothesis that this is the case. — Wittgenstein PI Sec X emphasis added
I can wield/use the words "Pass the salt" as a command/request, for example.
— Luke
...the point being that it doesn't have anything to do with "you". — Antony Nickles
I'm not sure what the grammatical point could be here with this example — Antony Nickles
The focus on "is used like" is on whether it is [ used ]: as an assertion, or, as a hypothesis; not on the person "using" a word, but on the possibilities of the expression (the possible uses); you could call these different senses, but it is not the "sense" (meaning) of the expression. — Antony Nickles
Now you can say: "I used belief as a hypothesis" but the focus is on differentiating between the uses that belief has, not that "your use" gave it, or related it to, the "meaning" that it has--you are merely clarifying among the limited options. — Antony Nickles
The word “language-game” is used here to emphasize the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity (PI 23)
To repeat: don’t think, but look! (PI 66)
We’re talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, atemporal non-entity. (PI 108) — LW
Of course if there is confusion we can ask: "What did you mean?", but the answer to this falls (usually) within a concept's grammar (its possible senses). Now this is different than saying there are rules and I "used the word" in accordance with its rules. — Antony Nickles
...the point being that it doesn't have anything to do with "you".
— Antony Nickles
I didn't mean to emphasize the "I", and I don't know why you think I did. — Luke
underline added...an expression can be used (e.g.) as an assertion or as a hypothesis, but which of those possibilities is actualised depends on what a speaker/writer actually does with it (how a speaker/writer actually uses it) in a given instance. — Luke
#43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. — Witt, PI
#531 We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by another which says the same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by any other.
#532 Then has "understanding" two different meanings here?—I would rather say that these kinds of use of "understanding" make up its meaning, make up my concept of understanding. — Witt, PI excerpts, emphasis added
Of course if there is confusion [about which sense] we can ask: "What did you mean?", but the answer to this falls (usually) within a concept's grammar (its possible senses). Now this is different than saying there are rules and I "used the word" in accordance with its rules.
— Antony Nickles
How is it different? Language is the game and grammar is its rules. — Luke
the way a word has meaning doesn't have anything to do with us, in the way your picture describes. — Antony Nickles
Your picture injects the speaker as "the user"; that the use of language depends on them. — Antony Nickles
But "the" use (not "our" use) is a part of language (our lives), not in the speaker doing something, "using it". — Antony Nickles
There is the whole of language, that is to say everything worth expressing or that matters in our lives, and this word has a role, a place. That is its use, not our using; the word's use, as in the word has a use, or uses; Witt will also call them senses (like varieties or options)... — Antony Nickles
...which depend (mostly) on the context, not upon my intention or my "actualizing" it. — Antony Nickles
An intention is embedded in a setting, in human customs and institutions. If the technique of the game of chess did not exist, I could not intend to play a game of chess. To the extent that I do intend the construction of an English sentence in advance, that is made possible by the fact that I can speak English. (PI 337)
[PI Part II] 295. How do I find the ‘right’ word? How do I choose among words? It is indeed sometimes as if I were comparing them by fine differences of smell: That is too . . . , that is too . . . — this is the right one. —– But I don’t always have to judge, explain; often I might only say, “It simply isn’t right yet”. I am dissatisfied, I go on looking. At last a word comes: “That’s it!” Sometimes I can say why. This is simply what searching, that is what finding, is like here. [see also 298, 300] — LW
There are two (at least) "understandings", and Wittgenstein is saying "in the sense of" to clarify/differentiate which grammar for this concept we are discussing. — Antony Nickles
This is one main part of this essay in understanding the impact of the desire for "mathematical" rules: — Antony Nickles
the point of the rule was to provide a foundation for a kind of certainty to our language, a bedrock — Antony Nickles
#531 We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by another which says the same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by any other.
#532 Then has "understanding" two different meanings here?—I would rather say that these kinds of use of "understanding" make up its meaning, make up my concept of understanding. — Witt, PI excerpts, emphasis added
So words have possible uses (senses, varieties, options), but we don't actually choose any of the uses/options? — Luke
(PI 337)An intention is embedded in a setting, in human customs and institutions. If the technique of the game of chess did not exist, I could not intend to play a game of chess. To the extent that I do intend the construction of an English sentence in advance, that is made possible by the fact that I can speak English. — Wittgenstein, PI # 337 emphasis added
we do not "use" words as in: do not "mean" words. — Antony Nickles
You may understand it as when Wittgenstein realizes that the internal process of "meaning" vanishes — Antony Nickles
All of this is externalized, so the sense (or use) of an expression is in the expression and context, not coming from us. — Antony Nickles
The rules determine which moves are allowable (make sense) in the language-game, and the moves allowable in the language-game are just the "possibilities" (different senses) that you mentioned. So, an expression can be used (e.g.) as an assertion or as a hypothesis, but which of those possibilities is actualised depends on what a speaker/writer actually does with it (how a speaker/writer actually uses it) in a given instance. — Luke
But our desire for "mathematical" certainty creates a picture of the power of (necessity for) judgments made previously (rules, moral imperatives) which threatens our ability to see we can continue, to wait, to try again, to listen, without which how can we teach anything new to anyone, try to tell someone something hard to hear, have any hope in a moral moment. — Antony Nickles
I think I understand what you are getting at now with your distinction between "mathematical" and "ordinary" rules. Wittgenstein refers to these as "calculi with fixed rules" and "the rules of a game" respectively (see PI 81). — Luke
We do not invent their [ word's ] meanings, we learn their meanings. And we learn to use them, and do use them, in accordance with the meanings that they have or can have. It is a mastery of a technique; a practice. — Luke
We obviously do use words, and we use them to mean this or that. — Luke
A game is "not everywhere bounded by rules" (PI 100), but it is still a game "for all that" (PI 68). Wittgenstein repeatedly compares language to games, and speaks of language as having rules (e.g. PI 84, 100, 125, 133, 549, 558). — Luke
emphasis addedConsider this analogy: in chess, no individual decides or determines the rules (the allowable moves; the grammar) of the game on their own, but individuals can and do decide the moves that they make from among all of the allowable/possible/meaningful moves. This is analogous to choosing/using one's words (to speak meaningfully). — Luke
However, I still disagree that morality is a significant theme of PI. — Luke
I think I understand what you are getting at now with your distinction between "mathematical" and "ordinary" rules. Wittgenstein refers to these as "calculi with fixed rules" and "the rules of a game" respectively (see PI 81). — Luke
We do not invent their meanings, we learn their meanings. And we learn to use them, and do use them, in accordance with the meanings that they have or can have. It is a mastery of a technique; a practice. — Luke
All this, however, can only appear in the right light when one has attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning, and thinking. For it will then also be clear what can lead us (and did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules. — Witt, PI # 81
We obviously do use words, and we use them to mean this or that. — Luke
A game is "not everywhere bounded by rules" (PI 100), but it is still a game "for all that" (PI 68). Wittgenstein repeatedly compares language to games, and speaks of language as having rules (e.g. PI 84, 100, 125, 133, 549, 558). — Luke
emphasis addedConsider this analogy: in chess, no individual decides or determines the rules (the allowable moves; the grammar) of the game on their own, but individuals can and do decide the moves that they make from among all of the allowable/possible/meaningful moves. This is analogous to choosing/using one's words (to speak meaningfully). — Luke
However, I still disagree that morality is a significant theme of PI. — Luke
"The ordinary" would just be all our everyday criteria that matter, say, for an expression to be an excuse, but which are not complete or whose application is fixed in advance, so, not like rules. — Antony Nickles
There are of course other kinds of rules than “mathematical” ones (but these are not Witt’s idea of criteria either). — Antony Nickles
But it is the desire for rules like math that Cavell is saying leads to Kripke’s picture of a rule-driven language (a complete system). — Antony Nickles
So I am trying to connect the desire for mathematical rules with the picture of acting/speaking "in accordance with the meanings that they have" which is manifest from that same desire to have the application judged as just right or wrong (as the picture of statements as just true/false). — Antony Nickles
133. We don’t want to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words in unheard-of ways.
For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear. — LW
Now, however, let us suppose that after some efforts on the teacher’s part he continues the series correctly, that is, as we do it. (PI 145)
The words “Now I know how to go on” were correctly used when the formula occurred to him: namely, under certain circumstances. For example, if he had learnt algebra, had used such formulae before. — But that does not mean that his statement is only short for a description of all the circumstances which set the stage for our language-game. — Think how we learn to use the expressions “Now I know how to go on”, “Now I can go on”, and others; in what family of language-games we learn their use. (PI 179) — LW
Wittgenstein is saying that the picture that we "mean" sentences (use them)... — Antony Nickles
Many words of our language are not everywhere bounded by rules (§§68, 71, 75–7). In some cases, such as proper names, W. claims, we use expressions without a ‘fixed’ or ‘rigid’ (feste) meaning at all (§79). The rules for the use of our words do not budget for every conceivable eventuality — and are none the worse, for all that (§80). But there is a powerful philosophical temptation to deny that this can be so. W., when he wrote the Tractatus, succumbed to it, thinking that the vagueness and indeterminacy exhibited by natural language is only a surface-grammatical phenomenon that disappears on analysis. [...]
A different temptation, and a different reaction to the fact that the words of natural languages are not everywhere circumscribed by rules, is to view natural languages as being defective to the extent that they do not meet this requirement. In philosophy, especially since the mathematicization of logic in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, we often compare the use of words in natural language with the calculi of logic, which have rigid rules. It is then tempting to say that natural language approximates such calculi — that the calculi of logic are ideal languages, by comparison with which natural languages are deficient. It is against this temptation that W. now warns. — Baker and Hacker
And if we do not have a complete system of rules (#133), then how can rules be the (only) way language operates? — Antony Nickles
Where is the connection effected between the sense of the words “Let’s play a game of chess” and all the rules of the game? — Well, in the list of rules of the game, in the teaching of it, in the everyday practice of playing. (PI 197) — LW
What happens when our rules would be not so much broken, as, just, run out? What happens beyond the bounds of rules? — Antony Nickles
Yes, we do not decide the grammar of a concept, but we also can not ensure which use our words will have. — Antony Nickles
Making the discussion about rules so important definitely makes any ethical or moral themes seem insignificant. — Antony Nickles
But it is exactly this fight against the desire for certainty, universality, the completely "mathematical" which Wittgenstein is impressing upon us as a moral obligation. — Antony Nickles
The pursuit of knowledge of our lives through an investigation of our language, learning about ourselves, the other, can be done in an ethical manner, attending to each grammar for each different thing, or tainted by the desire for an all-inclusive answer. — Antony Nickles
There is also the implications of his discussion of aspect blindness and that knowledge is not our only relation to the world. — Antony Nickles
So I am trying to connect the desire for mathematical rules with the picture of acting/speaking "in accordance with the meanings that they have" which is manifest from that same desire to have the application judged as just right or wrong (as the picture of statements as just true/false).
— Antony Nickles
I think this is confused. Language does have rules (grammar) even though it is not "everywhere bounded by rules"; even though the rules are not "complete". — Luke
The rules of language (that we are taught when we learn language-games) include how to use words "in accordance with the meanings that they have". And there are right and wrong ways to use them, otherwise any combination of words would make sense and none could be senseless (i.e. otherwise there is no grammar). PI 500 indicates this is not the case. — Luke
'Meaning is use' views meaning in the "right light", rather than thinking of meaning as a mental act, — Luke
What happens when our rules would be not so much broken, as, just, run out? What happens beyond the bounds of rules?
— Antony Nickles
If you're talking about beyond the rules of language, then the answer can't be "more language" or "let's talk it out", because there is no sense beyond the rules of language (i.e. grammar). Grammar is the bounds of sense. — Luke
"The ordinary" would just be all our everyday criteria that matter, say, for an expression to be an excuse, but which are not complete or whose application is fixed in advance, so, not like rules.
— Antony Nickles
You seem intent on talking about criteria instead of rules. Are you talking about ordinary rules or ordinary criteria? — Luke
But it is exactly this fight against the desire for certainty, universality, the completely "mathematical" which Wittgenstein is impressing upon us as a moral obligation.
— Antony Nickles
Do you have a reference? — Witt, PI 520
There is also the implications of his discussion of aspect blindness and that knowledge is not our only relation to the world.
— Antony Nickles
How is aspect blindness related, and do you have a reference for the knowledge part? — Witt, PI 520
There are of course some concepts for which the grammar involves rules, just not all concepts. — Antony Nickles
It is not grammar that makes an expression "senseless", as if our "using" it wrong makes it not an expression at all (without "sense", as in: lacking "a meaning"). It just is an expression (as, an event), it is we that cannot make out where it fits, — Antony Nickles
But it still has an impact — Antony Nickles
How is the picture of us "using language" not a version of a mental act? — Antony Nickles
How does simply externalizing "meaning" make our part in this picture not still causal (#220)? — Antony Nickles
(If you are "using language", where/how is the "using" process happening?) — Antony Nickles
If you can agree this should not be the picture, I'm not sure why we are still struggling to see that Witt's concept of "use" is not determined, as in caused, by us (beforehand), but determined, as in (in the sense of) figured out in making a determination (afterwards, when necessary), by the criteria for its grammar. — Antony Nickles
So our ability to "talk it out" is endless: justifying our acts, making excuses, weighing criteria to be applied in judgment, pointing out relevant context (ad infinitum), settling claims of the grammar of a concept. Those paths may close; the spade may be turned. But that does not end our relationship in continuing to resolve our differences (creating a new world--projecting a concept into a new context; standing in place of our words, whether mad or "before our time" or futily. — Antony Nickles
If we imagine language as driven by rules, then, having broken one or gone beyond it, there is not a lack of the ability to make sense, but nothing; we have reached our end. — Antony Nickles
When Witt refers to the ordinary he means all the criteria that are not "mathematical" (except for "mathematical" concepts). Mathematical criteria would be complete, universal, certain. etc. — Antony Nickles
We may not know this ahead of time (be aware or have it worked out explicitly, as they are imbedded in our lives). — Antony Nickles
[A criterion] is not part of a theory of meaning, but a modest instrument in the description of the ways in which words are used. As we should expect if we have followed Wittgenstein thus far, it plays a significant role in his philosophy, but not by way of a premise in an argument, nor by way of a theory. ‘An “inner process” stands in need of outward criteria’ (PI §580) is not a thesis from which philosophical propositions are proved. It is a synopsis of grammatical rules that determine what we call ‘the inner’. [...]
To explain the criteria for toothache, for joy or grief, intending, thinking or understanding is not to describe an empirical correlation that has been found to hold. For criteria, unlike symptoms (inductive correlations), determine the meanings of expressions for which they are criteria. To explain the criteria for the application of an expression ‘W’ is to give a grammatical explanation of ‘W’. It explains what we call ‘W’, and so explains a facet of the use of the word (AWL 17 – 19). To say that q is a criterion for W is to give a partial explanation of the meaning of ‘W’, and in that sense to give a rule for its correct use.
Philosophical questions commonly concern the bounds of sense, and these are determined by the rules for the use of words, by what it makes sense to say in a language. This is the source of philosophy’s concern with grammatical rules. For by their clarification and arrangement, philosophical questions can be resolved, and philosophical confusions and paradoxes dissolved. [...]
That a person’s action is rule-governed, that he guides himself by reference to a rule, is manifest in the manner in which he uses rules, invokes rule-formulations, acknowledges rules cited by others, refers to rules in explaining what he did, justifying what he did in the face of criticism, evaluating, criticizing and correcting what he did, and so forth (cf. PI §54). It is to these familiar features of rules and rule-governed practices that we now turn.
(1) The instructional aspect: We typically teach a rule-governed activity by citing rules, i.e. by using sentences as formulations of rules: ‘This is a pawn' [...]
(2) The definitory aspect: Rules define actions: for example, castling in chess [...]
(3) The explanatory aspect: [...] An action is explained by giving the agent’s reason why he acted as he did, and the rule which the agent follows provides part or the whole of his reason [...]
(4) The predictive aspect: The mastery of rule-governed techniques provides foundations for predictions. [...]
(5) The justificative aspect: A rule is cited in justifying (and also in criticizing) an action [...]
(6) The evaluative aspect: Rules constitute standards of correctness against which to ‘measure’ conduct as right or wrong.
Wittgenstein defines meaning in terms of use as an alternative to the commonplace picture that meaning is a mental act. You are questioning how use is not a mental act? If use is a mental act, and if 'meaning is use' as W says, then meaning must also be a mental act. This would defeat the purpose of Witt's definition of meaning in terms of use — Luke
Why do you think this supports Antony’s reading rather than mine? — Luke
This approach, therefore, reads the phrase “the meaning of a word is its use in language” as a ‘grammatical remark’, rather than a hypothetical remark or expression of a philosophical theory. This one might call for shorthand the Oxford reading — Joshs
Talking of the essence of Wittgenstein’s account of meaning is rendered redundant... — Joshs
...when one observes that nowhere does Wittgenstein offer an account of meaning. — Joshs
43. For a large class of cases of the employment of the word “meaning” — though not for all — this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. — LW
There are of course some concepts for which the grammar involves rules, just not all concepts. — Antony Nickles
Which concepts do not involve rules? — Luke
It is not grammar that makes an expression "senseless", as if our "using" it wrong makes it not an expression at all (without "sense", as in: lacking "a meaning"). It just is an expression (as, an event), it is we that cannot make out where it fits, — Antony Nickles
To whom is it "senseless" if not we English-speakers? — Luke
But it still has an impact — Antony Nickles
Having an impact is not synonymous with having sense. — Luke
How is the picture of us "using language" not a version of a mental act? — Antony Nickles
Wittgenstein defines meaning in terms of use as an alternative to the commonplace picture that meaning is a mental act. You are questioning how use is not a mental act? If use is a mental act, and if 'meaning is use' as W says, then meaning must also be a mental act. This would defeat the purpose of Witt's definition of meaning in terms of use. — Luke
For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. — Witt, PI #43
I suppose I could ask you how using a hammer is not a mental act? — Luke
How does simply externalizing "meaning" make our part in this picture not still causal (#220)? — Antony Nickles
Because I can't make words mean whatever I want them to mean. But I can use them with the conventional uses/meanings that they have. And intentionally so. — Luke
If you can agree this should not be the picture, I'm not sure why we are still struggling to see that Witt's concept of "use" is not determined, as in caused, by us (beforehand), but determined, as in (in the sense of) figured out in making a determination (afterwards, when necessary), by the criteria for its grammar. — Antony Nickles
How can we know the meaning/use afterwards if we don't know the meaning/use beforehand? — Luke
So our ability to "talk it out" is endless: justifying our acts, making excuses, weighing criteria to be applied in judgment, pointing out relevant context (ad infinitum), settling claims of the grammar of a concept. Those paths may close; the spade may be turned. But that does not end our relationship in continuing to resolve our differences (creating a new world--projecting a concept into a new context; standing in place of our words, whether mad or "before our time" or futility. — Antony Nickles
You're talking about what can happen in the future, as if a language-game or a game like chess is played according to all the rules over time that a game has had, does have, or will have in the past, present, and future. There might be conventional uses/meanings in the future which are not currently conventional uses/meanings, but that doesn't mean they have any meaning or use to us now. Should we postpone Wimbledon until we know what all the rules of tennis will be? Can we not decide whether or not a move in a game is legal (or makes sense) now? — Luke
If we imagine language as driven by rules, then, having broken one or gone beyond it, there is not a lack of the ability to make sense, but nothing; we have reached our end. — Antony Nickles
What's the difference in terms of language? — Luke
We may not know this ahead of time (be aware or have it worked out explicitly, as they are embedded in our lives). — Antony Nickles
You seem to be talking about the criteria of our concepts, while I am talking about the rules for the use of our words. — Luke
— Luke
[A criterion] is not part of a theory of meaning, but a modest instrument in the description of the ways in which words are used....‘An “inner process” stands in need of outward criteria’ (PI §580)... is a synopsis of grammatical rules that determine what we call ‘the inner’. [...] — Baker and Hacker on 'Criteria'
— Luke
To explain the criteria for toothache, for joy or grief, intending, thinking or understanding is not to describe an empirical correlation that has been found to hold...To say that q is a criterion for W is to give a partial explanation of the meaning of ‘W’, and in that sense to give a rule for its correct use. — Baker and Hacker on 'Criteria'
— Luke
Philosophical questions commonly concern the bounds of sense, and these are determined by the rules for the use of words, by what it makes sense to say in a language. This is the source of philosophy’s concern with grammatical rules. For by their clarification and arrangement, philosophical questions can be resolved, and philosophical confusions and paradoxes dissolved. — Baker and Hacker on 'Rules'
— Luke
That a person’s action is rule-governed, that he guides himself by reference to a rule, is manifest in the manner in which he uses rules
(3) The explanatory aspect: [...] An action is explained by giving the agent’s reason why he acted as he did, and the rule which the agent follows provides part or the whole of his reason [...] — Baker and Hacker on 'Rules'
(4) The predictive aspect: The mastery of rule-governed techniques provides foundations for predictions. — Baker and Hacker on 'Rules'
(5) The justificative aspect: A rule is cited in justifying (and also in criticizing) an action — Baker and Hacker on 'Rules'
(6) The evaluative aspect: Rules constitute standards of correctness against which to ‘measure’ conduct as right or wrong. — Baker and Hacker on 'Rules'
There are of course some concepts for which the grammar involves rules, just not all concepts.
— Antony Nickles
Which concepts do not involve rules?
— Luke
Hard to know how to take this. — Antony Nickles
The grammar of concepts is more varied than simply (only) judging right and wrong (in accordance with a rule), such as what counts in the concepts of thinking, being in pain, seeing more than looking, mistaking, dreaming, guessing thoughts, understanding (as like a musical theme #527), not to mention the differences of the role (and limits) of grammar in the concepts of justice, beauty, virtue, progress, knowing the other's pain, illusion, fairy tales, nonsense poems (#282), etc. — Antony Nickles
And concepts cannot all be taught by explaining rules... — Antony Nickles
...but in some cases only by giving/being an example or by practicing... — Antony Nickles
The totality of conditions of a concept's grammar are not worked out ahead of time (#183). — Antony Nickles
The point is that an expression does not carry "sense" (or meaning) or "senselessness", as if within it, but that we make sense of it, or give up, call it "senseless", as in there is no sense of a concept with which we can associate it to see how it is meaningful, not that it is categorically without sense because it does not follow a rule. — Antony Nickles
Even if we cannot make sense of an expression, place it within a sense of a concept--its grammar and criteria--a "sense" is not the only gauge or limit or result of an expression (you may just stare and gape #498). — Antony Nickles
I'm not sure how this isn't entirely circular, but, yes, I am questioning "explaining" "meaning" (let's say, how it always works) as "using" words, as (the act of?) your "meaning" it, or "intending" a meaning, even if my "meaning" is judged by conformity to a practice or convention. — Antony Nickles
For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.
— Witt, PI #43
Not sure we can have a universalized picture of "meaning is use" when we would only define it that way most of the time. — Antony Nickles
If my use of language in accordance with the rules for a practice is not the only definition of "meaning", then what are the other cases and how can these coexist? — Antony Nickles
Another case would be in which we expect the expression to be intended, chosen, purposeful, as in art, or a speech, as we would then claim something about the speaker "They are meaning to say X". — Antony Nickles
If the analogy is that an expression is used as a hammer is used (as a tool), it does not follow that all expressions are "used"... — Antony Nickles
...I grant that we can choose what we say, and even can agree that some concepts are (can be) tools... — Antony Nickles
...they can do things (as Austin points out), like promising... — Antony Nickles
Also, a hammer can be a tool, under the concept of hammering, but then so can a rock, though, even if used to hammer, is not then a hammer; and a hammer can be a weapon, but then would we say we have "used it" wrong? — Antony Nickles
...one could say I adhered to the rules for hammering (though on a person), but that is both true and yet seems to completely miss the point, as if to want to determine the meaning by an intellectual act. — Antony Nickles
Maybe the use of the hammer is a foregone conclusion rather than a discussion, but, even so, the judgment of whether it is hammering or bludgeoning would be clear without involving "your" use at all. — Antony Nickles
I agree that we cannot "make words mean whatever we want them to mean", but we also cannot make words mean something they can mean (our want does not factor in). In this picture you are still "meaning" them--using them to (or making them) "mean" some specific thing (here, a public, conventional use). — Antony Nickles
Again, how is using an expression "intentionally" not causal? — Antony Nickles
To take the "sense" or "meaning" out of your head and put it in the world, still leaves you in control of which use is meant, whether done right or wrong. — Antony Nickles
Again, we sometimes choose what we say, but we do not always do so, nor "intend" a use for what we say, as if our intention was always picking which use we wanted. — Antony Nickles
It is only in normal cases that the use of a word is clearly laid out in advance for us; we know, are in no doubt, what we have to say in this or that case. The more abnormal the case, the more doubtful it becomes what we are to say. And if things were quite different from what they actually are —– if there were, for instance, no characteristic expression of pain, of fear, of joy; if rule became exception, and exception rule; or if both became phenomena of roughly equal frequency —– our normal language-games would thereby lose their point. — PI 142
The use of "knowing", afterwards, is in the sense of figuring out ("Did you intend to shoot that mule?") — Antony Nickles
I am not talking about the world (necessarily) changing after we say something, but that the discussion of how an expression is meaningful, if necessary, begins after something is said. — Antony Nickles
The implication you assume is exactly the picture of rules for use that imagines we know all of the applications of a concept ahead of time, as if to resolve every discussion except whether we "used the expression" correctly. — Antony Nickles
Cavell would say this is placing too much importance on rules, not seeing that rule-following is discussed and then moved on from to show how the grammar of other concepts differs. — Antony Nickles
But if the judgment is simply that my use is senseless (wrong), then that does not give us anything to do other than correction (re-conformity) or rejection. — Antony Nickles
Expression is judged on criteria, not rules, and words are (nothing without) concepts. — Antony Nickles
In the sense in which there are processes (including mental processes) which are characteristic of understanding, understanding is not a mental process. (PI 154)
155. So, what I wanted to say was: if he suddenly knew how to go on, if he understood the system, then he may have had a distinctive experience — and if he is asked: “What was it? What took place when you suddenly grasped the system?”, perhaps he will describe it much as we described it above —– but for us it is the circumstances under which he had such an experience that warrant him saying in such a case that he understands, that he knows how to go on. — LW
To explain the criteria for toothache, for joy or grief, intending, thinking or understanding is not to describe an empirical correlation that has been found to hold...To say that q is a criterion for W is to give a partial explanation of the meaning of ‘W’, and in that sense to give a rule for its correct use.
— Baker and Hacker on 'Criteria'
Again, hard to say whether B&H need a correlation — Antony Nickles
And to say, e.g., that "recognizing your fault" is a criteria for an apology does not mean that it is a rule of correctness. The apology may still come off (I may accept it), as you may acknowledge your blame but I may still not consider it an apology. — Antony Nickles
So to say my contrition is an "explanation of the meaning of" an apology is to discount or limit what is meaningful to me, or in this situation, in exchange for a rule that dictates to me, over, say, my authority; skipping over, me. — Antony Nickles
B&H's claim is ambiguous as to who is doing what, when, but let's take it that the foundation on which you or I make a prediction is "mastery of rule-governed techniques". — Antony Nickles
Our justifications for acting only consist of pointing to rules to the extent a concept involves rules as part of its grammar. As they admit, even then a rule may only provide part of our rationale. We may also qualify our acts with excuses (mitigating our responsibility), extenuating circumstances (pointing to the context), etc. These are not judged as whether we rightly or wrongly followed a rule. — Antony Nickles
This paints the picture that we can clarify and arrange the rules for what makes sense regarding our questions, then they will be resolved as confusions or dissolve. Again, this puts our agreement about expressions ahead of the occurrence of an expression, now, by me, here, to you. It may be nothing, or it may be a philosophical moment, where we do not know how to understand the other, continue with our conversation; it may be a moral moment, where what I do in response defines who I am. None of these things are possible in a world where everything is agreed to ahead of time and all our questions are already answered, or deemed senseless, or confused. — Antony Nickles
Our inquiry is therefore a grammatical one. And this inquiry sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, brought about, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of our language. — Some of them can be removed by substituting one form of expression for another; this may be called ‘analysing’ our forms of expression, for sometimes this procedure resembles taking a thing apart. (PI 90)
If concept formation can be explained by facts of nature, shouldn’t we be interested, not in grammar, but rather in what is its basis in nature? —– We are, indeed, also interested in the correspondence between concepts and very general facts of nature. (Such facts as mostly do not strike us because of their generality.) But our interest is not thereby thrown back on to these possible causes of concept formation; we are not doing natural science; nor yet natural history — since we can also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes. (p. 230, 3rd edition) — LW
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